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Abstract 
The idea of trying to reduce an organization’s tax expense is considered as old 
as the inception of taxation itself as organizations are always trying to exploit 
loopholes in the complexities of the existing tax system. The traditional motive 
for such practices is to reduce expenses, thereby increasing the firm’s net 
profit. In view of this, tax avoidance has always been considered as being in 
the interest of the shareholders, as it is intended to increase value.  However, 
this view has greatly been questioned in recent researches. Taking data from 
the annual reports and financial statements of firms listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange (GSE), we empirically tested whether tax avoidance of a firm really 
translates to increase in value or profitability. Employing a standard Ordinary 
Least Square regression model, we test our hypotheses using SPSS statistical 
tools. Our findings confirmed a negative relationship between the tax 
avoidance measure (ETR) and the measure of profitability (ROA). We 
conclude that tax avoidance could translate into profitability or value due to 
the balance of expertise and professionalism exhibited. We recommend that a 
firm need to have a good corporate governance structure in place, particularly 
the board structure, since they are in a better position to influence 
management’s decisions and actions, in order to achieve the intended benefits 
of such practices.
 
Keywords: Corporate Tax Avoidance; Value Maximization; Under sheltering 
puzzle 
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Introduction 
Taxation is used as a tool of fiscal policy in controlling a country’s 
economy (Nwaobia, Kwarbai, & Ogundajo, 2016). It has also been used as a 
means of encouraging the growth of certain sectors and infant industries as 
well as encouraging investments. These are achieved by way of charging low 
rates to enterprises within those industries and granting some tax holidays to 
up to as much as ten (10) years for enterprises such as those in Tree Cropping, 
Cattle Ranching among others (Income Tax Act, 2015-Act 896). Regardless 
of these, to other entities the tax regime serves as a disincentive. Certain major 
corporate entities are continuously faced with the challenge of paying rather 
high corporate taxes. The obvious effect being that it adds to creating a high 
cost structure, depleting the after tax income distributable to the 
owners/shareholders of the firm. In the quest to reduce taxation costs, firms 
employ all means/activity that are legally acceptable within the country to 
increase their tax efficiency, thereby reducing their Effective Tax Rate (ETR). 
The idea of tax avoidance is of great concern to the general public and not 
viewed lightly since it leads to a reduced tax income for the country which is 
used for the supply of social amenities. 
According to Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012), Corporate Tax 
Avoidance is a term used to refer to all activities undertaken by firms to gain 
a tax benefit or increase tax efficiency (Abdul Wahab & Holland, 2012). Tax 
planning is traditionally viewed as being in the interest of shareholders since 
its aim is to cut down cost and increase the after tax profit. However, there 
have been opposing views on this notion. According to Armstrong et al (2015), 
the relationship between tax avoidance and value is not a straight line kind of 
relationship. It increases value in the form of positive net benefits (short term 
cash savings) but up to a maximum point beyond which the benefits derived 
from these activities becomes lesser than the costs involved and thus leads to 
fall in value. This phenomenon has been classified as the “under sheltering 
puzzle” by (Weisbach, 2001). In many researches about the value maximizing 
effects of tax avoidance activities, prior researchers suggest taking the 
governance structures into consideration in order to achieve the intended 
benefits of tax avoidance activities (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Wilson, 
2009). Nwaobia Appolos et al (2016) reported variations in the value 
maximizing effects of corporate tax avoidance among Nigerian manufacturing 
companies (Nwaobia et al., 2016). According to them, they found that the 
variations were due to differences in the governance structures of the 
companies and their use of knowledgeable professional experts. Drawing data 
from GSE listed firms, we test to assess whether corporate tax avoidance 
translates to increase in value and profitability in Ghanaian firms.  
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Literature/Theoretical underpinning 
Corporate tax avoidance and firm financial performance 
Tax planning/avoidance is viewed as a term to refer to strategized 
activities put in place in order to earn a tax benefit, being in the form of 
temporal tax benefits (Temporal Differences) or permanent tax benefits 
(Permanent Differences), with most firms preferring a permanent difference 
since temporal differences does not have an overall impact on the firm’s tax 
burden in the long run although yielding short term cash flow benefits (Abdul 
Wahab & Holland, 2012) (Maydew & Shackelford, 2005; Wilson, 2009). 
Traditionally, since the intention for engaging in tax avoidance is to 
reduce cost in the form of tax and maintain value, it is viewed as being in the 
interest of shareholders. However, research has shown that firms tend to have 
some tax avoidance related costs in hind sight in their efforts to earn such tax 
benefits. Thus, preventing the full realization of the intended benefits. 
Weisbach (2002) classifies this phenomenon as the “under sheltering puzzle”.  
According to Armstrong et al. (2015), benefits derived from tax avoidance 
does not have a linear relationship, but can be achieved up to an optimal level, 
beyond which tax avoidance related costs (e.g. costs of structuring 
complicated tax transactions, regulatory and reputational costs etc.) begins to 
exceed the benefits derived thereof(Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 
2015). Desai & Dhamapala (2006) argue that in a firm where there exists an 
information asymmetry (moral hazard), managers have a cover-up and tend to 
hide their self-seeking intentions for engaging in corporate tax avoidance, 
increasing the agency costs apart from the salaries and fees that are related to 
the tax avoidance activities. Thus, mitigating the value effects intended of the 
tax avoidance activities. In buttressing this and for shareholders to have 
control over managers’ tax planning decisions, Slemrod (2004) suggests that 
managers’ compensation ought to be linked with desired outcomes, for 
example, linked to a desired Effective Tax Rate (ETR) (Slemrod, 2004).  
There has been a lot of research on the subject (for instance by 
Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1983); Gupta & Newberry (Gupta & Newberry, 
1997); (Holland, 2010)etc.) and through their work tried to explain the 
possible reasons for differences in tax burdens based on the characteristics of 
the firm. The direction of research in this area has quite recently shifted into 
understanding the reasons for such differences and its potential effect on the 
overall firm value. Some studies on the value effects of tax planning found no 
direct link between measures of firm value and tax planning measures. (Cloyd, 
Mills, & Weaver, 2003) argue that this opposing view could be due to non-tax 
costs that cannot be quantified. However, other researchers on the subject like 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009) suggest that in an agency setting, tax planning 
may potentially lead to a fall in firm value, particularly when there exists 
information asymmetry. 
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In analyzing the potential effects of agency costs in mitigating the desired 
benefits or results from tax planning or avoidance worthy of consideration is 
the firm’s existing governance structure/corporate design. This is because 
agency problems exist or persist in a firm due to its governance structure. 
According to (Castellini & Riso, 2016), agency costs particularly increases in 
situations where the separation in ownership and control is wider. In extant 
literature on the subject, major mechanisms considered effective by 
researchers include the ownership structure, the board structure and the 
compensation scheme/structure in place (Florackis, 2008); (Mcknight & Weir, 
2009). In most prior researches on the subject, most researchers have focused 
attention on just an aspect of corporate governance. However, it has been 
suggested that this does not capture the overall strength and complexity of a 
firm’s corporate governance structure in place, as corporate governance is 
quite broad a phenomenon (Jiménez-Angueira, 2018). 
 
Methodology 
Sample and Data 
We take a sample of GSE listed firms and draw data from multiple firm 
year observations to make our empirical analyses. We use only GSE listed 
firms due to the uniformity in reporting requirements and availability of 
information. Data for this study were collected by analyzing and hand 
collecting vital information disclosed in the firm’s annual report and financial 
statement.  We employ the purposive sampling technique to screen down the 
firms such as financial firms, firms with losses reported in the period under 
consideration, firms with extreme ETRs etc.  
 
Variables 
Independent and Control Variables 
The independent variable, the measure of Corporate Tax avoidance in 
the firm denoted by CTA, is a proxy measure of the firm’s Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) measured as the tax expense divided by the profit before tax. We 
control for firm size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity, and board 
independence. These control variables have been shown in extant works to 
have effects on a firm’s corporate tax avoidance behaviors. They are measured 
as shown in table 1; 
Table 1 Measurements of control variables 
Variable Abbreviation Measure 
Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage Lev Long-term debt divided by total assets 
Capital Intensity Capint Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Inventory 
Intensity Invint Inventory divided by total assets 
Board 
independence Bind Proportion of independent board members 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the measure of the firm’s profitability, 
depicted by the measure of the firm’s return on assets, which is measured as 
net after-tax profit divided by total assets.  
 
Regression Model 
We present the firms profitability as a function of its dependence on 
the profit before tax, tax avoidance measure and the control variables. The 
model is as follows; 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3−𝛴𝛴𝛴𝛴𝐹𝐹𝛴𝛴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where CTA is the corporate tax avoidance proxy measure of ETR 
(either Accounting ETR or Cash ETR), PBT is profit before tax and ɛ is the 
error.        
 
Results/Findings and Discussions 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the data used for the 
study. The dependent variable ROA has a minimum of -0.02 and maximum of 
0.52. The independent variables ETR 1 and ETR 2 both have minimums of 
3.01E-003 and 1.46E-003 respectively, with maximums of 0.73 and 0.91 
respectively. The descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented 
in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
ROA 104 -.02 .52 .0812 .00822 .08384 .007 
PBTs 104 1.89E-003 15.21 .3616 .14545 1.48332 2.200 
ETR1 104 3.01E-003 .73 .2496 .01092 .11140 .012 
ETR2 104 1.46E-003 .91 .2326 .01321 .13476 .018 
SIZE 104 9.16 19.71 14.8249 .24116 2.45937 6.048 
LEV 104 0.00E+000 1.00 .0701 .01194 .12179 .015 
CAPINT 104 1.76E-004 .77 .2281 .02010 .20495 .042 
INVINT 104 .00 .58 .1512 .01127 .11489 .013 
BIND 104 .10 .92 .7552 .01607 .16386 .027 
Valid N 
(listwise) 104 
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Table 3 Correlations 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlation Analyses  
The Correlation analyses results are presented in Table 3. From the 
results, it is clear that both measures of corporate tax avoidance (ETR 1 and 
ETR 2) have significant correlation with the dependent variable ROA with 
 ROA PBTs ETR1 ETR2 SIZ
E 
LEV CAPIN
T 
INVINT BIND 
ROA 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .251
* -.216* -.231* -.169 .100 .146 .067 .014 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .010 .028 .018 .086 .311 .141 .497 .886 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
PBTs 
Pearson 
Correlation .251
* 1 -.215* -.157 .085 -.031 -.071 -.120 .029 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010  .029 .112 .390 .753 .471 .224 .771 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
ETR1 
Pearson 
Correlation -.216
* -.215* 1 .325** -.056 -.020 .137 .130 .189 
Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .029  .001 .574 .843 .165 .189 .055 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
ETR2 
Pearson 
Correlation -.231
* -.157 .325** 1 -.177 -.030 -.134 -.021 .070 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .112 .001  .073 .762 .174 .830 .478 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
SIZE 
Pearson 
Correlation -.169 .085 -.056 -.177 1 -.038 -.359
** .186 .147 
Sig. (2-tailed) .086 .390 .574 .073  .702 .000 .058 .137 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
LEV 
Pearson 
Correlation .100 -.031 -.020 -.030 -.038 1 -.020 -.264
** -.059 
Sig. (2-tailed) .311 .753 .843 .762 .702  .837 .007 .550 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
CAPI
NT 
Pearson 
Correlation .146 -.071 .137 -.134 
-
.359*
* 
-.020 1 .153 .190 
Sig. (2-tailed) .141 .471 .165 .174 .000 .837  .120 .053 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
INVIN
T 
Pearson 
Correlation .067 -.120 .130 -.021 .186 
-
.264*
* 
.153 1 -.110 
Sig. (2-tailed) .497 .224 .189 .830 .058 .007 .120  .265 
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
BIND 
Pearson 
Correlation .014 .029 .189 .070 .147 -.059 .190 -.110 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .886 .771 .055 .478 .137 .550 .053 .265  
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
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negative correlations of -0.216 and -0.231 respectively. This negative 
correlation is an indication that as corporate tax avoidance is increasing in a 
firm it translates to profitability since a lower ETR is an indication of higher 
tax avoidance in the firm. The correlations for the other variables are presented 
in Table 3. 
Table 4 Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .157 .061  2.591 .011 
PBTs .014 .005 .254 2.671 .009 
ETR1 -.171 .073 -.227 -2.338 .021 
SIZE -.008 .004 -.230 -2.145 .034 
LEV .109 .066 .159 1.656 .101 
CAPINT .026 .044 .063 .587 .558 
INVINT .156 .076 .214 2.045 .044 
BIND .054 .052 .105 1.034 .304 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Table 5 Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .189 .064  2.945 .004 
PBTs .015 .005 .262 2.787 .006 
ETR2 -.150 .061 -.241 -2.459 .016 
SIZE -.010 .004 -.287 -2.581 .011 
LEV .102 .066 .149 1.553 .124 
CAPINT -.007 .045 -.018 -.162 .871 
INVINT .146 .076 .200 1.930 .057 
BIND .051 .051 .100 .995 .322 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Regression Results 
Table 4 and 5 presents the regression results using both ETR 1 and 
ETR 2 interchangeable as the independent variable. From the results of the 
first regression analyses presented in Table 4(ETR 1 as independent variable), 
we find significant and negative influence of ETR 1 and SIZE on ROA with t 
values of -2.338 and -2.145 respectively, and significant positive influence of 
PBTs and INVINT with t values of 2.671 and 2.045 respectively. The Beta 
coefficients are presented in Table 4. Using ETR 2 as the dependent variable 
for the second regression analyses (results in Table 5), ETR 2 and SIZE 
measure significant and negative influence with ROA with t values of -2.459 
and -2.581, and PBTs measures a positive significant influence on ROA with 
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t value of 2.787. The Beta coefficients and the results of for the other variables 
are presented in Table 5. 
 
Conclusion 
As earlier discussed, there has been a lot of debate as to whether tax 
avoidance actually results in improving the firm’s value or the firm’s 
profitability. It is traditionally viewed that tax avoidance, since it is aimed at 
reducing expenses and increasing net after tax profit, enhances value and 
profitability. However, recent researchers have argued from empirical points 
that corporate tax avoidance does not translate to profitability or value 
maximization, this phenomena being argued as being the result of the 
corporate governance system in place. In our results, we found a significant 
negative relationship between the measure of profitability (ROA) and the 
measures of Corporate Tax Avoidance (ETR 1, ETR 2). Since a low ETR is 
an indication of a higher corporate tax avoidance within a firm, our findings 
imply that corporate tax avoidance in fact does translate to profitability and 
value.  
We conclude that corporate tax avoidance translates to profitability or 
value maximization, as was intended, when the firm has to its advantage a 
balance of expertise and professionalism by those entrusted in the hem of 
affairs of the firm, that is, the management. In a nutshell, there has to be a good 
corporate governance system in place to be able to put managers’ decisions in 
check in order for tax avoidance to result in the intended gain.  
 
Future Research       
Further research should focus on analyzing the interplay of other complex 
factors that are linked to tax avoidance behaviors in firms especially in Ghana. 
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